A Brief History of the National
Mariners Association
By Captain Richard A. Block
Our Association was founded in April
1999 as the Gulf Coast Mariners Association (GCMA) which the corporation decided
to change to the National Mariners Association effective Jan. 1, 2008 in light
of our national rather than regional audience. The AFL-CIO and four maritime labor unions(1)
established us as to function as a non-profit membership Association and not
as a labor union – a very fundamental distinction. I can say that I was there from day one with
Past President Penny Adams and Capt. Ray Adams and continue to believe that a
union could serve many of the needs of many of our mariners.
Our Association was formed to stand
on its own feet and represent the interests of our mariners. On June 30, 2003, the four maritime unions
ended their financial support and turned us loose as an independent
Association. Some people thought we
“closed our doors” at the time. However,
if you examine the reports and newsletters on our website, you will quickly
understand that this was never the case.
Nor did the unions “abandon”
us. They simply could no longer afford
to support a massive presence in the Gulf of Mexico area that generated few new
union members for their proposed new union, “Offshore Mariners United”
(OMU). The retreat of the proposed union
illustrated that mariners were beaten to their knees by big money that was
willing to hire “union busters” to deny our mariners a voice. This was unfortunate, because the union movement
has a great deal to offer and because, when the unions pulled out, we found
that the
vast majority of mariners in the Gulf of Mexico were unwilling or unable to
stand up for their rights because, to do so, brought with it a very real
risk of their jobs and careers. Only a
few years later, we see that continued repression by both the boat owners and
inept superintendence of the marine industry by U.S. Coast Guard regulators(1)
drives many experienced mariners to leave the industry. Nevertheless, our Association kept plugging
away with the truth on the important issues and accepted small gains without
generating headlines because those small gains are cumulative. [(1)Refer to NMA Report
#R-401-E.]
While membership in an active labor
union remains a choice for some mariners, an Association like ours could cope
with many of the important issues that affect limited-tonnage merchant mariners
in the anti-labor atmosphere that surrounds the limited-tonnage sectors of the maritime
industry today. Our goal always was to
exert a positive influence on the decisions that affect up to 126,000 of our “limited-tonnage”
merchant mariners who hold officer and ratings credentials as well as other merchant
mariners the Coast Guard has no record of.
We keep in mind that all important maritime decisions are made in
Washington, DC. [(1)AMO,
MM&P, MEBA, SIU]
Contemporary
Mariner Associations
During the mid-1990’s I watched,
supported, and joined the American Inland Mariners Association (AIM), a
non-union Association that successfully assembled over 300 river pilots under
the leadership of Captain John R. Sutton as a professional mariners
association. Unfortunately, in spite of
its successes and the perseverance of its President and Board of Directors, AIM
was eclipsed by the “Pilots Agree” movement on the Western Rivers and Gulf
Intracoastal Waterways in 1998. Neither
predecessor organization still exists but AIM serves as a model of a very
effective grass-root, mariner-directed movement.
I also joined the “Pilots Agree”
movement under Captain Dickey Mathes. “Pilots
Agree” was a true grass-roots movement involving as many as 1,500
mariners on the Western Rivers and the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway. However, I watched with dismay as the reaction
to Pilots Agree by towing industry management forced many mariners to learn
some very painful lessons both about their industry and about labor
solidarity. The International
Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots (MM&P), a well-established
professional union of “upper-level” licensed mariners, supported “Pilots Agree”
with advice, encouragement, and financial backing. Several hundred mariners joined “MM&P” as
well as Pilots Agree. MM&P stood by
working mariners in hearings before the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for
seven years as it still stands by its working mariners today.
“Pilots
Agree” led inland mariners in the towing industry to stand up and fight for the
right to organize. Unfortunately, management
refused to negotiate with their employees and turned against them. A strike followed, and as the
strike dragged on, paychecks stopped. Since
most mariners live from pay-check to pay-check, the movement gradually lost
momentum as mariners broke ranks and eventually turned against each other in a
scramble to salvage their own paychecks.
The result was devastating and long-lasting. Mariners constantly remind us today that the
employers’ repression of Pilots Agree members played a direct role in the
personnel shortages the towing industry faces.
In fact, employers continue to crush any attempts by mariners to create
meaningful organizations like the National Mariners Association that try to
bring their issues to the attention of regulators (USCG, OSHA, DHS) or to
Congress. Our Association learned that
our only hope to succeed in solving the major problems that trouble our limited-tonnage
mariners was to continue to provide the our government with certain truths as
seen from the perspective of our mariners no matter how unwelcome they may be.
Although Pilots Agree is now a part
of History, established maritime unions like the Seafarers International Union
(SIU), the Inlandboatmans Union (IBU), the International Union of Operating
Engineers, and the Sailors Union of the Pacific (SUP) have members who are
limited tonnage mariners. Other unions
like the American Maritime Officers (AMO) and the Marine Engineers Beneficial
Association (MEBA) worked closely with our association in the past. Inland towing companies, for their treatment
of mariners and failure to at least talk to them during Pilots Agree, reaped
what they sowed in a continuing shortage of talented mariners on our inland
rivers and waterways that will tighten as the amount of cargo they must move
increases.
Who Are Limited-Tonnage
Merchant Mariners?
The simple answer to this question
is that a limited-tonnage merchant mariner is any mariner that serves on a
commercial vessel of less than 1,600 gross tons.
Article 1 of the Officers Competency
Certificates Convention (1936) – an international agreement – stated, “National
laws or regulations may grant exceptions or exemptions in respect to vessels of
less than 200 tons gross register tonnage.”
The treaty was ratified by the United States on Oct. 29, 1938 and became
effective one year later on Oct. 29, 1939.(1) [(1)Marine
Laws, Navigation & Safety, 3rd ed., Vol. 2, art 729.]
One year later, the Motorboat Act of
1940 brought motorboats under 15 gross tons under regulation by the U.S.
Department of Commerce. Early in World
War II, wartime control of the U.S. Merchant Marine passed from the Commerce
Department’s Bureau of Marine Inspection and Navigation into the hands of the
Coast Guard where it remained throughout the war; this assignment became
permanent shortly after the war.
For a mariner on a small boat who
wanted to “carry passengers for hire” from 1940 to 1958, all he needed was a
motorboat operator’s (MBO) license. When
I received my first license in 1955, I studied Chapman’s Piloting,
Seamanship and Small Boat Handling, obtained a physical exam at the
U.S. Public Health Service Hospital at no charge except for a completely wasted
day, and was given an oral exam by the Officer in Charge, Marine Inspection (OCMI).
The clock was ticking and important
changes were in the works shortly after the motorboat Pelican disaster on Sept. 1, 1951 off Montauk Point, NY. The Pelican
was a 42-foot wooden charter fishing boat that set sail with 64 persons on
board in fair weather but with warnings issued for expected strong winds and
stormy conditions expected later in the day.
Since the vessel admeasured 14 gross tons, it was not required to be
inspected by the Coast Guard. The Pelican’s passengers were overcrowded on
board since a boat of this size ordinarily carried carry no more than 30
persons on exposed coastwise waters.
During the voyage, a storm arose, the vessel sank and only 19 survivors
were picked out of the water. The Coast
Guard investigation concluded on Oct. 8, 1951 a month after the accident and listed
19 persons as “missing” and 26 “deceased.”(1) [(1)NMA file #M-164. Also: Clavin, Tom High Noon,
ISBN-13-978-0-07-148659-0.]
Vessel Inspection
and Credentialing
Congress
directed the Coast Guard to take first steps in reforming the small passenger
vessel industry five years after the Pelican
accident – a process that continues to this day. New “small passenger vessel” inspection regulations were
introduced, upgraded and perfected continuously from that date forward. A new licensing scheme was instituted in 1958
and, as a result, the small passenger vessel segment of the marine industry cleaned
up its act.
Much the same occurred with the
offshore mineral and oil industry in 1970 starting with its crewboats that
were, in reality, small passenger vessels.
Congress moved forward in 1980 to establish the framework for manning,
inspection, and licensing of larger offshore supply vessels in Public Law
96-378. Ten years later liftboats were
added. In 1997, the Coast Guard
finalized its regulations that would govern an entirely new class of vessels dubbed
“Offshore Supply Vessels” (OSV) including crewboats.
Since 2000, our Association touted the
Coast Guard’s hard won “success” in inspecting approximately 6,500 small
passenger vessels,(1) and over 1,200 Offshore Supply Vessels(2)
to the towing industry as examples of the steps that they should follow to bring
over 6,200 towing vessels under inspection.
Congress overlooked towing vessels for more than 40 years, but by 2004,
it was difficult to continue to ignore a cascade of horrendous accidents involving
towing vessels that took place between 1993 and 2004. [(1)46 CFR Subchapters K &
T. (2)46
CFR Subchapter L.]
The record will show that long
before Congress mandated the inspection of towing vessels in September 2004,
our Association pushed the inspection issue with the Towing Safety Advisory
Committee (TSAC). After Congress
mandated the inspection of towing vessels, one of our Association’s most
significant efforts lay in preparing NMA Report #R-276, Rev. 9 that deals with
the inspection of towing vessels. The
report we submitted to the docket represented eight years of hard work on our
part. Many of the items documented in that
report are the key to bringing towing vessels up to the safety standards that
Congress demands of other types of commercial vessels. On the way, we witnessed efforts by management
to gut many issues, cut corners, and save money. Especially troublesome was their success in
uncoupling hours of service from towing vessel inspection regulations. While the proof of the pudding will be the
Final Rule on Towing Vessel Inspection expected in 2015, the battle over hours
of service will continue beyond that date.
Our Association filed a petition on this issue and Docket
#USCG-2014-0442 has been opened on our complaint.
Our Association expected the Coast
Guard to use the lessons they learned from fifty years of inspecting other small
vessels and apply them to towing vessels to include a greater array of vessels where
most of our mariners work. However, a
serious glitch occurred in 2007 when the report of retired VADM James Card tore
into shortcomings in the Coast Guard’s vessel inspection program.(1) We note today that overloading, over-work,
safety and health issues are the same that cropped up for the past 50 years and
must be resolved today for the good of mariners in the entire marine industry,
not just for towing vessels. [(1)Refer to NMA Report
#R-401-E.]
Captain Eddie” of the Pelican isn’t the first or last person
in charge of a vessel that was too greedy or too helpful to leave people with
money in their hands standing on the dock. Even today, not all officers are properly
trained, exercise common sense, or admit their shortcomings. An outstanding example remains the towboat officer
who never received adequate radar training and, even though he had a radar
display in his face, lost his way in the fog and struck a fixed bridge causing
the derailment of the AMTRAK Sunset Limited killing 45 people in 1993. The Coast Guard and Congress shared in the
blame for that accident by neglecting the towing industry and ignoring the
industry’s stagnated training program for over 20 years.
Issues
Presented to Congress
We welcomed all mariners to support our
Association and help us in perfecting those issues we presented to both the Coast
Guard and Congress. The issues that we
devoted most of our time and effort to were issues that overwhelmingly affected limited
tonnage merchant mariners although some may also have affected upper-level
mariners as well.
One
area where our mariners are particularly sensitive to abuse has been with the
National Maritime Center. Few employees
at the NMC have any sense of “institutional History” as existed before the
regulatory upheaval of 2009 followed by another on Dec. 24, 2013. The attitude appears to be summarized as: “If
you don’t like our decision, you can ask us to reconsider. If you don’t like that result, appeal”
it.” Given our nation’s hitching its
star to STCW, there
probably is even more to come! Useless
documents like the Transportation Workers Identification Credential (TWIC), increasing
hassle to obtain a Merchant Mariner Credential (MMC), and the new Medical and
Physical Standards dictated by the new “Medical NVIC” (NVIC 04-08) came into
effect in September 2008. Drastic
changes to credentialing regulations in 2009 created pure chaos as they
replaced older regulations and were enforced with newly hired personnel at the
National Maritime Center with little understanding of the mariners they were
attempting to regulate. Our Association submitted
two reports to Congress(1) that showed some of the effects of this
regulatory turmoil upon our mariners. NMA’s limited financial base at least allowed
our Association to keep track of these changing conditions and regulations and
to submit meaningful comments to the docket, at federal advisory committee
meetings, and to Congress that reflected the experience and attitudes of our
mariners. The effect of these changes
upon our mariners, especially in the towing industry suggests that new entrants
in the industry should think very carefully about building a foundation for
their future in the towing industry. [(1)NMA
Reports #R-428-D & R-428-D, Rev. 1.]
In August and October 2007, I had
the opportunity to testify before Congress – an honor last afforded to Captain
Sutton as President of AIM ten years earlier. I was again invited to testify again in
September 2008 before the House Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Subcommittee following the M/V Mel
Oliver oil spill in the Mississippi River and in July 2009 on the National
Maritime Center and Mariner Credentialing.
Although the Coast Guard often chose to ignore us, we were fortunate
that Congress understood many of our problems, and in 2010 and acted on them.
Several of our Directors led the way
in pointing out to Congress that mariners suffered from the absence of
enforceable potable water standards. As a result, Congress passed legislation that
informed the Coast Guard of their responsibility to regulate potable water on
commercial vessels. Unbelievably, even
with this legislation in force, the Coast Guard managed to fumble the ball and
years later must be “prodded” again to do as Congress directed. Consequently, we continue to urge mariners to
report every case of substandard water for drinking, bathing, and cooking to us
as this remains a very active project.
On over thirty (30) occasions, we
presented our mariners’ perspective to Members of Congress and their staffs in
a number of reports. These are highlighted
in our Association’s Report Index – “Index R.”
On occasion, our mariners or Directors delivered these reports to
individual Congressmen in person. By
reviewing Index R, whenever you find the word “Congress” in the title of
the report, you can identify each of these reports. We continue to bring important issues
directly to the attention of Congress whenever the Coast Guard procrastinates,
blocks our way, or simply ignores us.
Issues Presented to the Department of
Homeland Security Inspector General
Coast Guard Investigations & Coast
Guard Personal Injury Reporting
On behalf of our Association, NMA
attorney Mark L. Ross, Esq. presented evidence to the Federal District Court in
Lafayette, LA, to the Department of Transportation Inspector General, and to
Coast Guard Headquarters describing how one major maritime employer failed to
report 44 serious mariner injuries as required(1) to the Coast Guard
in writing within five days.(2)
He obtained this evidence by searching court records where injured
maritime workers subsequently sued this employer. The Coast Guard never punished the company in
any manner for failing to do so. A later
study performed by the Department of Homeland Security Inspector General’s Office
showed that other companies were equally lax in their reporting practices to
the detriment of our mariners. [(1)Required
by 46 CFR §4.05-1(a)(6). (2)As
required by 46 CFR §4.05-10(a).]
Using Coast Guard accident
statistics supplied at an advisory committee meeting, the omission of these
accident reports by ENSCO skewed the Coast Guard personal injury statistics
submitted by the entire offshore boat industry during an eight-year period by
approximately 25%. Nevertheless,
authorities from the local Coast Guard Marine Safety Office to the Department
of Justice expressed complete indifference about enforcing requirements to
report mariners’ personal injuries.
Many
mariners learn the hard way that after they are injured and are unable to work,
they are quickly fired or simply forgotten.
Often they are abandoned without health or disability insurance
coverage.(1) This practice,
if more widely
reported, would play a larger role in dissuading individuals from taking a
quick job in the marine industry. [(1)NMA Report #R-202, Rev. 5.]
There are many instances where
vessel Masters filed personal injury reports with their employers but these
reports were never forwarded to the Coast Guard within the five-day period as
required by existing regulations. There
are additional cases where accident reports were fabricated months after the
accident occurred and then filed with and accepted without question by the
Coast Guard. We believe our mariners,
who are ineligible to receive “workmen’s compensation” for their injuries,
inevitably suffer when an accident report involving their injury is thrown
together months later and is accepted by Coast Guard officials without
question.
Consequently, our Association
petitioned the Coast Guard to allow an injured mariner to submit
his own report to the Coast Guard if he/she believes the “owner, agent, master,
operator, or person in charge” (i.e., those persons currently authorized to
submit such a report) either have not made or submitted the required personal
injury report on form CG-2692 within the required five working days. In addition to our original petition filed on
Sept. 7, 2001, we filed an additional petition on Aug. 8, 2002 with the U.S.
Department of Labor seeking “Improved Record Keeping and Accident Reporting for
Lower-Level Mariners.” We assert that
the OSHA personal injury recording and reporting system – if enforced – appears
to be far superior to the Coast Guard’s system and has clear benefits for our
mariners.
In a letter dated June 30, 2005, the
Chief of the Coast Guard’s Investigation Division, stated in part: “We have
opted to add a section to (the Marine Safety Manual), rather than draft a new
policy letter, to ensure investigating officers understand the policy that all
incidents reported to the Coast Guard are investigated.” We deemed this response unsatisfactory. Hiding comments in relatively inaccessible
internal agency documents like policy letters or even the Marine Safety
Manual does not provide the unambiguous regulatory protection our mariners
need. Consequently, it is of little
value in protecting our mariners and requiring employers to properly document
their employees’ on-the-job injuries.
NMA Report #R-350-Y covers this issue in greater detail.
Our Association learned of a
Congressional request of Dec. 16, 2005 by committees of both the House and
Senate to audit the extent to which marine casualty investigations and reports
result in information and recommendations that prevent or minimize the effect
of casualties. We indicated our interest
in this audit.
In response to our request, we were
visited at our office by two DHS auditors from Boston. We began to provide data that eventually comprised
15 volumes weighing approximately 22 lbs. – collected, evaluated and mailed
over a six-month period representing the investment of considerable time,
effort and postage. Thereafter, I spoke
with the Chief Auditor Mr. Richard Johnson on a number of occasions and visited
him in Washington. I was impressed with
his professional attitude and approach to the issue, as well as his extensive
knowledge and background in accident investigation and the maritime industry in
general as a credentialed merchant marine officer. The 2008 Inspector General’s report
indicated that several thousand casualties were either improperly investigated
or never investigated at all! The
“Casualty Investigations Program” is a critical part of the larger Coast
Guard’s Marine Safety program – a program that Congress revised from the ground
up in 2010. Rep. Elijah Cummings
openly complimented Richard Johnson on his 2008 report on Coast Guard Investigations
during the Cosco Busan hearing. The
Inspector General’s concern stands in stark contrast to the Coast Guard’s
policy of totally ignoring input from our nation’s 126,000 credentialed merchant
mariners.
Our Association
reported on past problems with Coast Guard “Investigations” by reprinting two
previous landmark reports on the Internet.
What is clear and outstanding is that that the Coast Guard should have
handled these problems years ago but was remiss in doing so. This should have been clear to Coast Guard
leaders as their own reports illustrate.
These two reports appear on our website as:
●NMA Report #R-429-A, Rev 1. U.S. Coast Guard Marine Casualty
Investigations and Reporting: Analysis and Recommendations for Improvement
by James G. Byers, Susan G. Hill, & Anita Rothblum. Aug. 1994.
●NMA
Report #R-429-B, Rev. 1. Report
of the USCG Quality Action Team on Marine Safety Investigations. July 1996.
Remarkably,
the full extent of the collapse of the Coast Guard Investigations framework
appeared in the DHS Inspector General’s Report #OIG-13-92 issued in May 2013
that reported: “The USCG does not have adequate processes or
sufficient personnel to investigate, take corrective actions, and enforce
regulations related to the reporting of marine accidents as required by Federal
regulations and USCG policy….” The
shortcomings were shocking – and there was absolutely no mention of the
failures to follow up Coast Guard personal injury reporting that we
had carefully explained to auditors in our office in March 2012. In effect, Coast Guard officials in
Headquarters covered up problems that were well known almost twenty years earlier. During the intervening years, the Coast Guard
did little or nothing to correct the problems.
These remarkable shortcomings are a serious departure from the way that
Congress expected the Coast Guard to handle casualty investigations.
Our position on reporting
personal injuries as taken from NMA Report #R-350, Rev. 6, “Issue Y” are as
follows:
To review the Congressional intent of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 and to determine why the Coast Guard
failed to effectively apply key existing OSHA regulations to the marine
industry.
To enact additional safeguards that require
employers to report, treat, and compensate all mariners and offshore workers
injured on the job.
To reassign the personal injury data
collection responsibility for health and safety issues from the Coast Guard to
the Department of Labor.
To impose adequate deterrent civil penalties
on employers who fail to report and track every “accident, injury, illness, and
death” to a seaman, passenger, or other person on any inspected vessel.
To permanently separate reports of personal
injury and illness from vessel and equipment casualty reporting.
Participation
in the Work of Federal Advisory Committees
From April 1999 to June 30, 2003, four
maritime labor unions supported our Association’s participation at federal
advisory committee meetings like the Towing Safety Advisory Committee (TSAC),
the Merchant Marine Personnel Advisory Committee (MERPAC), and the National
Offshore Safety Advisory Committee (NOSAC). These committees give our mariners limited
access to Coast Guard officials at the headquarters level. However, sometimes that access simply is not
enough because we are outvoted, marginalized, and our agenda is often
sidetracked. We had occasion to complain
to Congress about inadequate mariner representation on TSAC and they responded
by increasing the number of working mariners assigned to the committee – an
important step in the right direction.
NMA’s Clear
National Agenda
Our Association always encouraged
and helped each of our members to present his/her views on important issues. This involved time, hard work, and a
commitment to putting mariners’ thoughts on paper. We learned early-on that unless we could reduce
valid mariner complaints to writing that moaning, ranting, and unrecorded
telephone conversations are simply lost to the wind. On the other hand, written correspondence has
a life of its own!
In 2000, our Report #R-201 presented
documentary evidence from 58 mariners that they were overworked and their
work-hours were exploited. Although this
report was widely circulated, the Coast Guard Marine Safety Directorate chose
to ignore the report. In 2004, Congress
mandated a Coast Guard study on Crew Endurance Management (CEMS) and received
it a year later. In 2010, Congress
directed the Coast Guard to require all inspected vessels to maintain Official
Logbooks and keep accurate records of mariners’ hours-of-service. Four years later, the Marine Safety
Directorate still had not acted on this requirement. Our Association, using an accumulated series
of reports compiled a Report to Congress(1) on violations of the
12-hour work day. In May 2014, our
Association petitioned the Coast Guard for a rulemaking on this issue, and Docket
#USCG-2014-0442 was opened at our request.
After fifteen years, we still hope to put an end to the unlimited work-hour
demands by many maritime employers. Unbelievably,
well into the 21st. century, we still must convince Congress that a
12-hour workday limit should apply to both Officers and Ratings. [(1)NMA Report #R-370, Rev.
4.]
Although
the towing and barge industry trade association AWO pushed the CEMS concept to
its limit, we
suspect that their underlying aim was to justify an extended work day of
fifteen hours for ratings (i.e., unlicensed engineers, deckhands, tankermen and
cooks) and to further reduce crew size at our mariners’ expense. While our Association
supports the “scientific aspects” of the Coast Guard’s CEMS program, we do not
support the continued abuse of our mariners’ health and safety by working them
to death. Our Report #R-412 shows one
case where a major towing company literally worked Engineer Gary Duncan to
death! Report #R-412-A, Rev.1 reflects a
near-death experience and permanent disability of Chief Engineer Leon Manderson
on an OSV. Our Association remains
vigilant and active on the issue of fair treatment for our mariners and has no
intention of backing off.
Training and working with the trade
union movement opened many doors for our Association during the past 15 years
so that we are able to function in Washington in a limited way and present our
issues to the Coast Guard, their “parent” Department of Homeland Security, and
other Executive-branch agencies, as well as to Congress. Nevertheless, it costs a great deal of money
just to travel to Washington and cities where Federal Advisory Committees meet and
stay for several days to conduct business. This is where the support from donations
became vitally important. Since we are
not a labor union, we cannot engage in collective bargaining with individual
employers to obtain higher salaries, improved benefits, and better working
conditions. However, we refuse to turn
our backs on documented mariner abuses by individual employers.
Although many of our mariners
express strong political beliefs, our Association does not engage in partisan
politics. Our issues are limited in
number and are available in writing.(1) [(1)NMA
Report #R-350, Rev. 7.]
It was unfortunate that far more mariners
used our services than supported us with annual dues. However, the day of the “free lunch” is over. Mariners who need our active assistance must
be turned aside and directed to our publications. Donations will have to absorb some of our expenses
simply to maintain an active website. NMA’s work with a select group of attorneys
ensures that mariners who are injured on the job can receive adequate legal
advice and direction. Unfortunately,
representation by a qualified admiralty attorney is expensive. Consequently, we emphasize the importance of
safety in preventing injuries and death, and support and encourage reports from
those Counselors who help injured mariners recover from injuries.(1)
[(1)Refer to NMA Report
#R-350, Rev. 7, Issue “Y”.]
A Few
Good Men and Women
In the past, when we solicited membership
in the National Mariner’s Association it was a family membership. We wanted to represent mariners who were, or sought
to become, professionals in the maritime industry. We looked for supporters in the ranks of those
who…
- instinctively
told the truth as they saw it;
- intended
to abide by existing laws and regulations as they knew and understood them;
- were
willing to use their knowledge and experience to work to change and improve
laws, regulations, and policies wherever necessary;
- were
willing to learn anything they needed to know to perform their jobs creditably;
- were
not blinded by an inflated ego;
- respected
family values;
- were
willing to do a day’s work for a day’s pay,
- were
willing to exercise qualities of leadership whenever called for.
- were
willing to voluntarily share their knowledge with other mariners but expected
to be paid when for their services when used as “trainers.”
We still believe these are all
“good” qualities and are goals worthy of attaining even as mariners slowly work
their way along a career path.
NMA
Publications – Research Reports and Newsletters
Our Association prepared almost 230
active research reports that are in our library. To the best of our ability to keep up with
changes, we updated these reports when we obtained new information so as to maintain
an updated overview of each topic including, in some cases, copies of recent government
reports so we could quickly respond to public inquiries.
For many years, Captain
J. David Miller posted our research reports and newsletters on the NMA
website’s home page. In January 2008, he
transferred the information on that website to a new NMA website with a new
host. NMA studied several dozen issues
that concerned our mariners and reported in detail on each of them. This was the key to our undertakings from the
beginning and especially after we became an independent organization in
mid-2003!
One of our most important works was
the “Yellow Book” assembled by Captain Ray Adams and his crew in 2000 and is
still available as our Report #R-201, Mariners Speak Out on Violation of the
12-Hour Workday. The fact that the
Coast Guard and management “stonewalled” the report and tried to obscure all it
states and implies was to their great discredit. The report gives a remarkable snapshot of how
many of our mariners were mistreated fifteen years ago and shows how little has
changed since then. This obstruction also
shows why NMA actively challenged the Coast Guard’s Marine Safety Directorate’s
to maintain continued “superintendence” over the U.S. Merchant Marine in light
of their many failures. We were not a
voice in the wilderness on this issue and were not the only ones to see too
many examples of the Marine Safety Directorate’s unbridled arrogance and lack
of effective leadership to allow it to continue to victimize our mariners. The violation of health, safety, and welfare
as well as hours-of-service regulations and statutes led to our presenting the
matter to Congress and to forcefully request rulemaking on these issues in
2014. Our issues with the Coast Guard’s
lack of attention to the industry’s lack of comprehensive personal injury
reporting remains an important topic with the DHS Inspector General’s
office at this time.
One area where we expended much
effort lay in publishing the “NMA News” a newsletter for mariners published
every couple of months to keep our mariners posted on important issues. We published 94 issues to date with a final
issue scheduled. Many articles in the
Newsletter were instructional and intended to reflect “best practices” or
direct mariners to areas to improve their knowledge and understanding of the
industry. We urged all mariners to
spread the news that our newsletter was fully accessible on the website. We were disappointed to find that
availability of a printed copy “on the boat” appeared to have a much greater
impact although the cost of printing and postage proved to be prohibitive! We urged mariners to print copies of the
newsletter on their own computers and share it with others to increase our
support, but there were few signs that this was ever done.